Shabnam Saidalavi, School of Legal Studies, Cochin
Editor’s note: Freedom of expression is a fundamental right that goes to the very heart of individual identity and collective interaction. Freedom of the media has been a contentious issue, especially when it involves scrutinizing a free trial. This paper examines the past and present stands taken by India in the matter, as well as the innumerable experiences and a few reports submitted by the different democracies worldwide. Among them, the perspectives of America and England have been given great consideration as their citizens have proven to be the victims of media trial plethora of times in the past.
Even though the roots of the idea of constitutionalism was obtained at a very early time, the consistent, continuous and purposeful course of the constitutionalism as a modern worldwide ideology came in the wake of some of the most momentous and pivotal developments in human history. Dethronement of absolutism was accompanied by institutional checks and balances, including by the media, civilian supremacy in the structure and control of government, onward march of self-determination and democratization and the concomitant accountability of authority, progressive ascendancy of individual rights, reinforced judicial remedies and power of public opinion. Constitutionalism may be nothing but the combination of the developments which have taken place at the level of social psychology, institutions, living styles and thinking processes over many centuries.[i] The West of Europe and America have accepted and are completely committed to the idea of constitutionalism. The developing countries have miles to go, whereas India stands distinctively and uniquely, as it occupies the pride of place on the constitutional canvas of the world.
The Fundamental Rights are rooted in the recognition of the individual as well as the rights of groups and the rights of the society. The concept of reasonableness permeates our charter of Fundamental Rights. These are not static concepts. They change over the decades despite the fact that all the problems are not brought to the courts. Those problems which are at the grassroots are still left unsolved and needs to be given adequate consideration and scrutiny.
According to Jean Jacque Rousseau, thought and speech are born free but everywhere they are in chains. In ancient India, the principle of freedom of thought and expression was rooted in the philosophy of the divinity and the uniqueness of every individual as well as in the philosophical theorem that diversities of expositions and interpretations do not extract from the unity and coherence of holistic truth, more rhetorically with the aphorism “Ekam Sad Viprah Bahudha Vadanti” which means “The Truth, that which Is, One”. Article 19 (1) (a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression. It provides for the right to express one’s own convictions and opinions freely by words of mouth, writing, printing, pictures, media etc. It has evolved through many centuries of human history as a facet of freedom at the very source of individual identity, social condemnation and collective interaction. The expression also connotes publication, thereby including freedom of the media in the category. Since publication would be of little value without circulation, the freedom of propagation of ideas is secured by freedom of circulation. Freedom of expression helps an individual to attain self-fulfillment, assists in the discovery of truth, strengthens the capacity of an individual to participate in decision-making, and provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change.
Freedom of the media
An offence that could be writ large on the media, to restrain it from its activities would be that of defamation. It is both a criminal as well a civil wrong in India which has been codified in Section 499 of the IPC. It defines the offence and explains, delineates and illustrates the concept of defamation and its exceptions as well as legal offences available to the accused. One of the major problems which cause untold harassment to editors, printers and publishers of newspapers in India is the institution of criminal and civil proceedings against them in different and far flung Courts. The Press Commission did not accept the plea raised by several newspapers, quite often on the same news item, in different parts of the country. The Press Commission recommended that unless there is prima facie case of malice, the Magistrate should dispense with the personal appearance of the accused and left it to the wide discretion of the Magistrate.[ii]
Freedom of the Media to which our Founding Fathers were greatly attached finds no mention in Part III of our Constitution which guarantees certain fundamental rights. There is no specific guarantee of Freedom of the Media as in the Constitutions of other countries. Speaking on behalf of the Committee, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar expressed that, “the media has no special rights which are not to be given or which are not to be exercised by the citizen in his individual capacity. The editor of a Press or the Manager of a Press is all citizens and therefore, when they choose to write in newspapers, they are merely exercising their right of expression and in my judgment, therefore, no special mention is necessary of the freedom of the media at all.” The word “expression’ used in Art. 19 (1) (a) in addition to ‘speech’ is comprehensive enough to cover the press. The lack of specific mention of the media in the Constitution created no difficulty when the Supreme Court was called upon to protect the freedom of the media in several cases, which came before it, right from 1950. Even the modern science and technology have invented and are still inventing and bringing into use many forms of expression and facilitate communication of ideas. The fundamental right guaranteed thus includes collective right of the community, the right of citizens to read and to be informed, to impart and receive information. In substance, it is the right of the people to know.[iii]
The proclamation on 25th June, 1975 is significant enough in the discussion of the freedom of the press. It was nothing but the censorship issued during the emergency. The requirements of the Censorship Order issued on that day were difficult to meet, particularly with regard to the submission of all news, comments, rumours or other reports for scrutiny prior to publication. The Censorship Order did not even provide for appropriate procedural safeguards. In many cases, the Order was applied with indiscriminate, excessive and mindless severity.
The freedom of the media calls for an institutional forum of the media and for maintaining and improving the standards of newspapers and news agencies. Such an institutional forum was re-established in India by the Press Council Act, 1978. It is vested with certain powers in cases where the newspaper or the news agency may have offended against the standards of journalistic ethics or public taste or when an editor or a working journalist has committed any professional misconduct.
Right from Ramesh Thappar v.State of Madras[iv], in which the court held that the freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organizations. Thereafter, the freedom of the press had begun to be widely enforced and acknowledged. In Prabhu Dutt v. Union of India[v], the Supreme Court held that the right to know news and information regarding administration of the government is included in the freedom of press. This right is not absolute and hence, restrictions can be imposed on it in the interest of the society, and the individual from whom the press obtains the information. In Prabhu Dutt, the court directed the superintendent of Tihar Jail to permit the chief reporter of the Hindustan Time to interview two death sentence convicts, under Art. 19 (1) (a) as they were willing to be interviewed. In State v. Charulata Joshi[vi], the Supreme Court held that the press does not have an unfettered right to interview an under-trial prisoner. The permission granted by the court would be subject to the relevant rules and regulations contained in the prison manual. In M. Hasan v. Government of Andhra Pradesh[vii], the court held that the denial by jail authorities to a journalist and a videographer to interview the condemned prisoners in jail amounts to deprivation of a citizen’s Fundamental Right of freedom of speech and expression under Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh[viii], the Supreme Court held that it is possible that a right does not find express mention in any clause of Art. 19 (1), and yet it may be covered by some clause therein. In Bennett Coleman & Co. V. Union of India[ix], the Central Government argued in support of the news print policy that its subject-matter was rationing of imported commodity, and not freedom of speech, and the test to adjudge the validity of a regulatory provision should be its subject-matter, its pith and substance, and not its effect or result. The court rejected this approach and enunciated the test as whether the effect of the impugned action is to take away or abridge Fundamental Rights. The Supreme Court’s opinion that the freedom of speech available to a Member of Parliament under Art. 105 (1) as well as to a member of a state legislature under Art. 194 (1) is wider in amplitude than the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (a) in P. V. Narasimha Rao v. State[x]. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain[xi], is the case in which the court underlined the significance of the right to know in a democracy. It was held that Art. 19 (1) (a) not only guarantees freedom of speech and expression, it also ensures and comprehends the right of the citizens to know, and receive information regarding matters of public concern. The court pointed out the significance of the right to receive information in the context of elections through the Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India[xii]. Times Global Broadcasting Co. Ltd. and anr.v.Parshuram Babaram Sawant[xiii], was watched closely by all news media, politicians, celebrities and other targets of alleged defamation.
In the present, the laws are being made for the riches and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not stand as an exception. The First Amendment rights of those in positions of power and wealth have generally found great favour than the First Amendment rights of those well situated. The constitutional guarantee of free speech has been immune to the pressures of politics, culture, and the marketplace, since the Congress has passed several laws that limit this freedom. These include the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798; the Espionage Act of 1917; the Smith Act of 1940; the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001; and laws controlling libel, invasion of privacy, publication of military secrets, and obscenity.
The rights of individuals are protected from actions of the media through libel law, invasion of privacy law, and guarantees of a fair trial. There is often a conflict between an individual’s right to a fair trial and the media’s right to cover that trial. The Supreme Court of the United States of America has generally ruled that the judge, not the press, is responsible for guaranteeing the defendant a fair trial. The Court has also ruled that protection of the right to a fair trial should require as few limits on the freedom of the press as possible. This can be done by imposing gag orders, sequestering the jury, postponing or changing the venue of a trial, or ordering a new trial. Since 1977, courts in the United States have been experimenting with allowing cameras in the courtroom. Proponents of such a policy argue that televising trials allows the public to better understand how the justice system works; thereby instigating the opponents to argue that cameras are intrusive and turn trials into media circuses.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution says, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” It provides for free speech and expression and is one of the universally enforced principles of the American Constitution. Courts did encounter important First Amendment issues before World War I itself. For example, in the struggle over the Sedition Act of 1798- America’s first major free speech fight, the bulwark of the Federalist Party convicted the members of the Democratic party, the rivals, for the crime of uttering “false, scandalous, and malicious” criticisms of the federal government[xiv]. Another example would be the Substantial First Amendment issues in the late 1800s and early 1900s during which the court upheld a libel conviction against a libel conviction against a newspaper for statements critical of the President and the Secretary of War. Communists, union activists, and Jehovah’s witnesses started exerting their rights of free speech and expression in the 1930s making the court sensitive towards free speech issues.
The onset of the civil rights movement also liberated great amount of First Amendment queries. Harry Kalven, in his book, The Negro and the First Amendment 66 (1965) pointed out that the ‘Negro revolution’ carried out an almost military assault on the Constitution via the strategy of systematic litigation. The Supreme Court of the U.S., expanded protection in areas such as asserting the First Amendment rights of corporations, protects commercial advertising, spending and contributing money etc. The history has significantly contributed to nurture with whatever it could to enhance the First Amendment rights to the country during varied instances. There was much debate over U.S President Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial and prosecutor Kenneth Starr’s investigation and how the media handled the trial by reporting commentary from lawyers which influenced public opinion. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion received a submission from the British Irish Watch against a very sustained attack by the press on Mrs. Bernadette and Mr. Michael McKevitt who had been advocating national sovereignty for Ireland and who were claiming the Irish people’s right to self-determination through a Committee. It was the media which started linking these two persons to the Omagh bombing of 15th August, 1998 which killed 29 people. The media attack started even before the police questioned these two persons.
Strict contempt of court rules prevent the United Kingdom from sliding into US-style “trial by media” where freedom of expression takes precedence over the right to a fair trial. The UK law on contempt is set out in the 1981 Contempt of Court Act, which applies to all publications that create “a substantial risk” in which the course of justice will be “seriously prejudiced”. The 1981 Act was passed, in part, in response to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in a case involving The Sunday Times, and was perceived as representing a shift in the balance of public interest in favour of freedom of speech. The law does not set out what is allowed or not but lays down broad principles: it is a question of judgment in each case as to what may create “substantial risk”. Some British media lawyers are warning, however, that constant challenges to the limits on what can be reported are threatening the “due process” of the law of the United Kingdom as such. There is a great need to balance the rights of a press with the right of an individual to a fair trial. Such an exigency is evident from the O.J. Simpson acquittal in 1995 in California, as well as the case against Geoffrey Knights, in which the judge ruled as “unlawful, misleading, scandalous and malicious”. At the same time, the world’s media descended on Winchester for the start of the Rosemary West trial, with journalists reporting for an overseas audience unfettered by the reporting restrictions during which the then Lord Chief Justice, Peter Taylor, felt that the juries were capable of concentrating on the evidence and resisting the media’s sensationalist excesses.[xv]
The American view appears to be that Jurors and Judges are not liable to be influenced by media publication, while the Anglo-Saxon view is that Judges, at any rate may still be subconsciously influenced and members of the public may think that Judges are influenced by such publications under such a situation. Lord Denning had stated in the Court of Appeal that Judges will not be influenced by the media publicity, a view which was not accepted in the House of Lords. Cardozo, one of the greatest Judges of the American Supreme Court, referring to the “forces which enter into the conclusions of Judges” observed that “the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their curse and pass the Judges by”.
In practice, a number of matters are relevant when considering if a publication is likely to create a “substantial risk of serious prejudice”. For example whether the trial involves lay assessors, such as a jury, the likelihood of the publication coming to a potential juror’s attention, it’s likely impact on an ordinary reader at the time of publication and the so-called fade factor , that is, how far away the trial is likely to be. The longer the gap between publication and the trial, the less the substantial risk of serious prejudice is likely to be. In previous cases involving the media, gaps of three and 10 months between publication and trial were held to have lessened any risk and in yet another case involving ITN and the publication of widely circulated information that a prisoner who had escaped from jail was a convicted IRA terrorist did not negate that risk.
Trial by media made famous or infamous by the Simpson case has arrived in full regalia in India with a virtual retrial in Jessica Lal case, where intense outpour of protest after a not guilty verdict had forced the hands of Government to order a retrial. Quite similar trend has been observed in other recent cases, viz, the Nitish Katara murder case, the rape cum murder of Priyadarshini Mattoo and most importantly the Nirbhaya rape case which evoked great sympathy and outrage from the Indian masses. Though the role played by media in bringing the accused of these heinous crimes to justice is certainly commendable, the question remains that how far the doctrines of free speech can be stretched to subvert free and fair trial. The question becomes even more volatile as due to years of judicial backlog our country men seem to rely more on instant media justice than the reasoned verdict by law court.
‘Trial by Media’ as a term refers to the role of Media acting as a Judge overriding the official “justice delivery system” thereby distorting, prejudicing, sensationalizing, instigating the public and ultimately derailing the ‘justice delivery processes’ and steamrolling the right to fair trial of the accused. It may be more commonly understood by the expression covering all the occasions where the media provokes public hysteria akin to a lynch mob which makes a fair trial impossible as well as affects the reputation of a person regardless the result of the trial.
Article 6 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary states that the judiciary is entitled and required “to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected.” Similarly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), also provides that “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal” in the determination of any criminal charge or in a suit at law. The freedom of speech and expression and consequently the freedom of press also finds place in International Charters like Article 19 of ICCPR and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In India the ‘Right to fair trial’ of the accused is granted under Article 20 and 21 of the Constitution while Freedom of Press which, though not separately and specifically guaranteed, has been covered under ‘Freedom of speech and expression’ which is a fundamental right under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and the basic structure. Also Article 38 of the Indian Constitution clearly advocates the ‘right to impart and receive communication’.
The conflict between the freedom of speech and that of fair trial raises question marks that are painstakingly unanswerable. The Supreme Court had even held that a trial by press, electronic media or by way of a public agitation is the very anti-thesis of rule of law and can lead to miscarriage of justice.
In M.P. Lohia v. West Bengal[xvi], the Supreme Court cautioned the media for publication of issue which was prejudiced, and the same decision was later succeeded by the judgment in State v. Mohd. Afzal & Ors[xvii]. In the celebrated judgment of Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan,[xviii] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the court need not concern itself with the method by which the evidence in question was obtained. Thus, evidences collected through sting operations are admissible in the court of law but with certain limitations. Further, any confessions made by the accused during the operation are admissible as evidence under the Evidence Act as these can be treated as extrajudicial confessions made to a third party. Only confessions made in police custody are not admissible owing to the possible use of coercion, whereas the statements made to an undercover journalist can stand legal scrutiny if made voluntarily and not under any threat or inducement. In State of Maharashtra v. Jalgaon Municipal Council[xix], the Apex Court observed that an accused cannot be convicted merely because anybody including press so desire. The press has right to publish court proceedings but this right is not absolute one and is subject to two limitations. Firstly, it should not amount to contempt of court and secondly, it should not prejudice the accused. The view taken by the Punjab High Court in Rao Harnarain v. Gumori Ram[xx] stated that “Liberty of the press is subordinate to the administration of justice. The plain duty of a journalist is the reporting and not the adjudication of cases.”
On the freedom of speech and expression, the law of contempt imposes a significant limitation by prohibiting publication of any matter which prejudices a fair trial and a careless and scandalous attack against a judge imputing indirect motive amounts to criminal contempt of court. The law of contempt aims to prevent interference with the administration of justice. Criticism, which undermines dignity of court, cannot be permitted under cloak of freedom of speech. The powers of contempt conferred on the Supreme Court and High Courts by Articles 129 and 215 are constitutional powers. In addition we have Section 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which provides that the power of a court of record to punish for contempt of itself is to prevent any unlawful interference with the administration of justice and to preserve the dignity of the legal system in the interest of the general public.
The Law Commission of India categorizes ten type of publications in the media as prejudicial to a suspect or accused: (1)Publications concerning the character of accused or previous conclusions; (2) Publication of Confessions; (3) Publications which comment or reflect upon the merits of the case; (4) Photographs; (5) Police activities; (6) Imputation of innocence; (7) Creating an atmosphere of prejudice; (8) Criticism of witnesses; (9) Premature publication of evidence; (10) Publication of interviews with witnesses.[xxi]
Laws to preclude the access to courts or government-held information are mandatory in certain instances. It could be to prevent the disclosure of identity of the victim of an offence of rape or sexual assault under Sections 376, 376 A, 376 B, 376 C, 376 D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the same is punishable under Section 228 A except with the permission of the court. It could even be to protect the report of inquiry held under the Children Act, 1960, with particulars leading to the identification of the child (S.36). The proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (S.22), the Family Courts Act, 1984 (S.11), the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (S.33), the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (S.53) held in camera add as no exception. The protection of the details relating to the identity of minors involved in the proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (S.36) is also highly guaranteed.
The Australian Law Reform Commission in its Report[xxii] on Contempt and Prejudice to Jury accepted the risk that reports of legal proceedings may contain material that could prejudice a jury trial. It recommended that a Court should have power to postpone publication of a report of any part of proceedings if it is satisfied that the publication could give rise to a substantial risk that the fair trial of an accused for an indictable offence might be prejudiced because of the influence which the publication may have on jurors[xxiii]. In ¶ 327, it recommended the ban on media reports of committal proceedings. The Law Reform Commission of Victoria[xxiv] was of the same opinion as the Law Reform Commission of Australia[xxv]. The Commonwealth Government, Australia also recommended the implementation of its 1992 Paper[xxvi] and prepared a Bill on that basis for the consideration of a Standing Committee of Attorney General. The Bill of 1993 was called the Crimes (Protection of the Administration of Justice) Amendment Bill, 1993. In Canada, it is not permissible to pass a suppression order on the basis of speculative possibility of prejudice to a fair trial but the publication must be of such as would create ‘real and substantial risk’ of prejudice to a fair trial[xxvii]. The Irish Law Reforms Commission has recommended stricter provisions of a ban on reporting of preliminary proceedings of indictable offences, such as committal proceedings.[xxviii] In fact, that was the position under sec. 17 of the (Ireland) Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 and the Commission felt that that provision has never been questioned in Ireland. Such a procedure would ensure that media did not report matters which a criminal court could treat as ‘inadmissible’ later. There are several statutes such as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Terrorist and Disruptive Act, 1985 (1987), the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, and the Unlawful Activists (Preventive) Act, 1967 as amended in 2004. These Acts contain a number of exceptions to the principles or open justice. The most reckoning research on the positive and negative aspects of media trial has been elaborated in 200th report of the Law Commission entitled Trial by Media: Free Speech vs. Fair Trial Under Criminal Procedure (Amendments to the Contempt of Court Act, 1971) that has made recommendations to address the detrimental impact of sensationalized media coverage on the administration of justice. The Commission has restricted publication of any prejudicial material immediately after the time of arrest and not from the time of filling the charge sheet as is the present position under Section 3 (2) of the Contempt of Court Act.
The contempt legislation dates from the early Eighties, when the flow of information could largely be controlled. But, the development of computer networks and satellite TV news are accentuating concern that the law is lagging behind technology. In our country, lack of knowledge of the law of contempt currently shows that there is extensive coverage of interviews with witnesses. This is highly objectionable even under current law, if made after the charge sheet is filed. Hence, it is imperative that a just balance between the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed in Article 19 (1) (a) and the due process of criminal justice required for a fair criminal trial be created as part of the administration of justice. Therefore, the Article 19 (2) can be used to impose restrictions for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act and it indicates that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Sections 2 and 3 respectively, take care of the protection of the administration of justice and discourse of justice.
It is recommended that the publications made after the arrest of a person be made criminal contempt if such publications prejudice any trial later in a criminal court. Therefore, it is required that the word ‘pending’ in Section 3(1), (2) and Explanation used at different places be substituted by the word ‘active’. It would also benefit the accused or suspect or others affected by the prejudicial publication if a separate section is inserted for the purpose of enabling the Court to punish for criminal contempt by publication under sub clause (ii) and (iii) of Section 2(c). It would enable the High Court to take action directly in the manner stated under Section 15 (1) either suo motu or as the application of any person as the balancing of the rights of freedom of speech and the due process right of the suspect or the accused can be done more appropriately by the High Court which is a Constitutional Court. Aspects of constitutional law, human rights, protection of life and liberty, law relating to defamation and Contempt of Court are important from the media point of view.
The first Prime Minister of independent India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had remarked that he would rather have a completely free press with all the dangers involved in the wrong use of that freedom than a suppressed or regulated press. The great amount of danger involved in the administration of justice which is the very essence of the natural justice and the rule of law was not foreseen. The Fourth Estate has had great institutional impact and has provided to be the bastion of open and free expression and has provided immeasurable inputs into the processes of democracy and rule of law. With all the conflicts and the unhandy tribulations that it faces today, it remains, on the whole, a very visible, resilient, responsible and crucially balancing democratic force.
Edited by Neerja Gurnani
[i] Dr. L.M. Singhvi, Freedom On Trial, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. About the development of constitutionalism
[ii] Review of The Press in India (2008 to 2012), Report submitted to The Press Council of India
[iii] Legal India, Legal Service Network & Free Law Resource Portal
[iv] AIR 1950 SC 124
[v] AIR 1982 SC 6
[vi] AIR 1999 SC 1379
[vii] AIR 1998 AP 35
[viii] AIR 1963 SC 1295,
[ix] AIR 1973 SC 106
[x] AIR 1998 SC 2120
[xi] AIR 1975 SC 865
[xii] AIR 2001 Del 126
[xiii] 2011(113) BomLR3801
[xiv] SPEECH AS POWER: OF SWASTIKAS, SPENDING, AND THE MASK OF “NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES”- LAURENCE H. TRIBE- CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES- UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING CO. PVT. LTD.
[xv] 2014 Guardian News and Media Limited
[xvi] Appeal (Crl.) 219 of 2005
[xvii] 2003 VII AD Delhi 1, 107(2003) DLT 385, 2003 (71) DRJ 178, 2003 (3) JCC 1669
[xviii] 1987 AIR 1748, 1987 SCR (3) 46
[xix] On 14 February, 2003
[xx] AIR 195.Punjab 273
[xxi] 2014 Indian Streams Research Journal
[xxii] Report No.35, 1987
[xxiii] Para 324 of the Australian Law Reform Commission Report
[xxv] Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Comments on the Australian Law Reform Commission Report on contempt No.35, 1987
[xxvi] Australia, Attorney General’s Dept, The Law of Contempt: Commonwealth Position Paper (1992)
[xxvii] Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corpn: (1994) 120 DLR (4th) 12
[xxviii] Irish Law Reform Commission, Contempt of Court, Report No.47, 1994, para 6.37to 6.42 and Consultation Paper (1991) 343-350