By Meenakshi Menon, NUALS
A breach of contract occurs when one party has not performed its promise in accordance with the terms of the contract. The very intention of filing a lawsuit for a breach of contract is to seek the appropriate remedy for the same. As defined in Black’s law dictionary a remedy is “the means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or compensated. The word “remedy” in a legal context has virtually the same meaning in a medical context, namely, to cure. In a legal context, a remedy cures the violation of a legal right. Common law provides two types of remedies i.e. legal remedy and equitable remedy.[i]
The practice of granting equitable remedies came about to compensate for the inadequacies of the common law courts which could not grant remedy if the affected party wanted the performance of the contract or wanted to prevent the commission of a wrong threatened. As the maxim ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’ goes, the principle that wherever there is a wrong there will be a remedy is the basis of granting equitable remedies as opposed to legal remedies which provides damages or compensation.
When we look at the history of equitable remedies, its evolution and the current status it can be seen that there are aspects of uncertainty and the courts discretion play an important role. But from the end of the 17th century throughout the 18th century and till the end of the 19th century equity became the force that moulded the progress of law.
to Holdsworth even though equitable remedies like specific performance has been unnamed and unregistered it has been spotted from the early times, he brings out this aspect that has been showcased in the Shakespearean play ‘Merchant of Venice’ where Shylock is denied specific performance of his contract, the debate is still alive as to whether it was fair to him. [ii]
ORIGIN OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES
As is well-known, England and most of her former colonies operate under a common law system. Very briefly, this means that in the absence of a statute or other legislation or regulation, judges have the authority to decide what the law is on a particular issue. Subsequent courts addressing the same issue are then bound by the previous court’s decision, which is known as a precedent. In order for this system to develop in an organised fashion, precedent was rigidly applied; if the facts of the case were more or less the same as a precedent, the precedent governed the case before the court.
Fairly early on (in the Middle Ages) cracks began to develop in the system A separate system, known as equity, began to develop parallel to the common law system (and continued to develop over the course of several hundred years). The two separate court systems that resulted were empowered to award different types of remedies. Courts of law could award damages, i.e. money, to compensate a person for the loss he or she had suffered. In those rough days of the 13th century it was the king and king alone in his council who had the wide discretionary powers to do justice among his subjects but by 1384 the king passed all these duties to the chancellor.
The Chancery Court, which was the court of equity, could award remedies that would restore equilibrium and lead to a just and fair result between the parties. In order to eliminate problems that arose from these differences, the separate courts were, for all practical purposes, merged in the 19th century. However, the classification of rules and remedies as legal or equitable survives.
This is so because the system of precedents that characterizes the common law system requires that decisions and remedies be based on earlier cases, and so judges and lawyers still need to make these distinctions in the argumentation and decision processes. The courts have determined are a variety of equitable remedies, but the principal remedies are: Injunction, Specific performance, Account of profits, Rescission, Declaratory relief, Rectification, Equitable estoppels, Subrogation[iii]. The most popular ones were injunctions and specific performance.
ORIGIN OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
At common law contract is a ‘personal agreement’ between two parties, and because of the personal nature and character of the relationship thus evolved, in the eyes of the common law, either of the contracting parties may unilaterally decide to breach the contract. The only remedy provided at common law, for such course of conduct is payment of damages by the guilty party to the innocent party. Whether damages are adequate for the wrongful act is not within the consideration of the common law.
On the contrary Courts of Equity deemed such a course in many instances inadequate for the purposes of justice; and, considering it a violation of moral and equitable duties, they did not hesitate to interpose, and require from the conscience of the offending party a strict performance of what he could not, without manifest wrong or fraud, refuse. Therefore, the position in equity was that the court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, will in certain circumstances compel parties to a contract freely entered into, to perform their obligations according to the terms of the contract and to respect the sanctity of the contractual relationship created by their acts.
The Equity courts in England invented the remedy of specific performance to give effect to contracts relating to immovable property. They found that in some cases it was more appropriate to award compensation instead of or in addition to a decree for specific performance. To confer upon equity jurisdiction to decree compensation Lord Carin’s Act was passed in 1858[iv]. If equity had not interfered in this way, it would have been possible in many cases for parties to a contract to buy off their duties under the contract to the detriment of innocent parties.[v].
In Wolverhampton Corp v Emmons 1 KB 515 the plaintiff acquired land for an improvement scheme and sold part of it to the defendant, who covenanted to demolish houses on it and build new ones. The demolition was carried out and plans for new houses approved. The defendant then refused to continue. It was held that specific performance would be ordered since the defendant’s obligations were precisely defined by the plans, and damages would be inadequate because the defendant had possession of the site, and the plaintiff could not get the work done by employing another contractor.
Specific performance was granted in cases where damages will be insufficient because something about the contract is unique, the court will award specific performance. In Nutbrown V. Thornton[vi] Specific performance was ordered of a contract to supply machinery which could not be readily obtained elsewhere. Another element that can be traced in the way specific performance is granted is that courts discretion is of foremost importance. It has been broadly stated that the extraordinary remedy of specific performance is not a matter of right in either party, but is a matter of discretion in the court.
This discretion, however, is not an arbitrary or capricious discretion, but a sound and reasonable discretion, which is governed as far as possible by established principles of equity, and which grants or withholds relief according to the circumstances of each particular case when the established principles do not furnish any exact measure of justice between the parties.”[vii].
Another important case we come across where specific performance was awarded was Beswick v Beswick[viii] where a nephew promised his Uncle to pay an annuity to his Aunty in consideration of the Uncle transferring the goodwill of the business to the nephew. The Aunty was not a party to the contract. The court held that it could be specifically enforced by the Uncle’s personal representative (the Aunty) against the nephew.
Damages would have been purely nominal as the promisee or his estate had suffered no loss. The nephew would have been unjustly enriched by being allowed to retain the entire benefit of the uncle’s performance without performing his own promise. Here we see that the court has decided the case using its own discretion on the basis of equity and fair play even though she is a third party in the contract.
However when a suitor’s right to the remedy of specific performance is not absolute, a court can decline to grant it. However, before a court may take such a course it must examine the contract together with all of the circumstances revealed by the evidence and from the entire situation. Then the court shall determine whether the case presents equitable grounds for denying specific performance.
If a denial of specific performance is made then the court must find its justification in established equitable principles and not in the chancellor’s personal views concerning justice. The main reason the court takes such a stand is that it is undesirable and impractical in the administration of justice to grant an order for specific performance. An order is unlikely in cases where the contract is for personal services or if the contract would require constant supervision by the court. [ix].
The courts did not grant this remedy when the losses or hardships sustained by the defendant would be well in excess of the loss suffered by a successful claimant.[x]. In Johnson v. Humphrey[xi] it was said that the court did not grant specific performance of a contract whose terms are inconclusive, uncertain or ambiguous.
For, it is not within the jurisdiction of the court to make a contract for parties. However, where the alleged inconclusiveness or uncertainty can be understood by reference to the context of the agreement, specific performance of the agreement may be granted.[xii]. While this was the pattern being followed by the courts in granting specific performance we can also see that there were cases in which order of injunction was passed by the court
ORIGIN OF INJUNCTIONS
It can be seen that with regard to the award of injunction, the starting point for the merger was the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 which empowered the Common Law Courts to grant injunction in certain cases; and common injunctions were granted to restrain proceedings opposed to equity and finally the Judicature Acts, 1873-75 which abolished the old system of courts and in its place, created the Supreme Court of Judicature with power to administer law and equity.
By 1191 the provisions of section 16 of the Act of 1873 the Supreme Court of Judicature was vested with all the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by both the common law and the Chancery Courts. Section 25(8) of the Act specifically provides that ‘the High Court may grant… an injunction … by an interlocutory order in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient so to do … either unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.’ [xiii].
In Isenberg v. East India House Co. (1863) 3 and Smith v. Smith[xiv] it can be seen that the court has issued a mandatory injunction whereby a party is compelled to restore things to the condition in which they were at the time the plaintiff’s complaint was made or before the defendant committed the act complained of. The general trend was to favour the grant of prohibitory rather than mandatory injunction. For a long period, most injunctions were prohibitory both in form and substance.
Such judicial attitude could have been for the reasons of history and convenience or the reason could be that the remedy of injunction is essentially restrictive. Secondly, it was much easier to restrain a party from doing an act than to compel him to perform a positive act, since the Court of Equity will not grant a remedy, the enforcement of which will require the supervision of the court. Thus, the general restrictive character of injunction and the drastic effect of mandatory injunction in particular favoured the disinclination of the court to grant mandatory injunction.
In one of the early cases in England, Lumley v Wagner[xv] the court issued a prohibitory injunction against the defendant, she had contracted to sing for the plaintiff in his theatre for three months and, at the same time, not to sing elsewhere during this time without the plaintiff’s consent. A third party, Gye, offered the defendant a larger sum to sing for him. The court stated that they had no power to make the defendant sing at the plaintiff’s theatre.
However, the court could persuade her to do so by preventing her singing elsewhere by imposing an injunction to that effect. If and when mandatory injunction is granted, greater caution is exercised, and for a long period of time a mandatory injunction was always granted in negative terms when it was obvious that its effect was positive.
Later on in the case of Davies v. Gas Light and Coke Co.[xvi] it was said that distinction in principle between granting a prohibitory injunction restraining a party from interfering with a right and granting a mandatory injunction in a positive term, compelling a party to grant a right is limited. The merits of an injunction are the overriding consideration; whether an injunction is mandatory or prohibitory in form or substance is of little significance provided the effect of the order does not impose an impossible or unenforceable or unlawful obligation.[xvii] Another case where it was held that defendant could be restrained by injunction from breaking the second undertaking which was not to act or sing for anybody else for two years without the plaintiff’s written consent, was Warner Bros v Nelson.
Both the action for specific performance and injunction depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In determining each case, the equities of each fact situation are of paramount importance. It was thought appropriate if it resulted in more perfect and complete justice. Therefore, one coming to a court seeking equitable remedies must show that there is equity and good conscience in support of his/her claims to relief.
EVOLUTION OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES IN INDIA
In India the courts of justice are courts of both law and equity and so many refinements which beset this kind of jurisdiction as administered by the courts of chancery could be got rid of in our country but still the inherent difference between the two great classes of relief remained and there remained the fact that the former of these namely specific relief though more exact was more delicate and more difficult to administer and that it required more skill and care on the part of the judge.
Some guidance of the legislature was, therefore, necessary for him and hence the specific relief act 1877. It embodies the equitable principles which have so long continued to govern the exercise of that remedial justice one peculiar to the court of chancery but now by recent legislation applicable by all courts alike in England. The specific relief act is pre-eminently an embodiment of English jurisprudence. its author was a practical English lawyer who derived his materials from the jurisprudence in which he has been trained.
The act codifies those rules of equity and good conscience by which our courts in India have been bound to govern themselves[xviii]. In India, the common law doctrine of equity had traditionally been followed even after it became independent in 1947. However it was in 1963 that the “Specific Relief Act” was passed by the Parliament of India following the recommendation of the Law Commission of India in its ninth report on the act, the Specific Relief Bill 1962 was introduced in Lok Sabha in June 1962 and repealing the earlier “Specific Relief Act” of 1877.
Under the 1963 Act, most equitable concepts were codified and made statutory rights, thereby ending the discretionary role of the courts to grant equitable reliefs. With this codification, the nature and tenure of the equitable reliefs available earlier have been modified to make them statutory rights and are also required to be pleaded specifically to be enforced.
Further to the extent that these equitable reliefs have been codified into rights, they are no longer discretionary upon the courts or as the English law has it, “Chancellor’s foot” but instead are enforceable rights subject to the conditions under the 1963 Act being satisfied. Nonetheless, in the event of situations not covered under the 1963 Act, the courts in India continue to exercise their inherent powers in terms of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which applies to all civil courts in India.
There is no such inherent powers with the criminal courts in India except with the High Courts in terms of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Further, such inherent powers are vested in the Supreme Court of India, in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India which confers wide powers on the Supreme Court to pass orders “as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause of matter pending before it”.
The Law of Specific Relief seeks to implement the idea of Bentham who said: “The law ought to assure me everything which is mine, without forcing me to accept equivalents, although I have no particular objection to them.” The Law of Specific Relief is in its essence, a part of the law of procedure, for Specific Relief is a form of judicial redress[xix].
In executor contracts, a suit may be brought to compel the performance of the contract by the person in default. Such relief may be either positive or negative. It is positive when a claim to the performance of it and negative when it is desired to prevent the doing of thing enjoined or undertaken as not to be done. In other words, specific relief is a remedy which aims at the exact fulfilment of an obligation. It is remedial when the court directs the specific performance of contract and protective when the court makes a declaration or grants an injunction.
Specific Relief Act was enacted in 1877. The Act was originally drafted upon the lines of the Draft, New York Civil Code, 1862, and its main provisions embodied the doctrines evolved by the English Equity Courts. The Specific Relief Act, 1963 is the outcome of the acceptance by the Central Government on the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India.
They had in their ninth report put forth certain recommendations on the Specific Relief Act, 1877, except in regard to Section 42 which was retained A bill to repeal the Act of 1877 was introduced in Lok Sabha and was passed by the both the houses of Parliament and on 13th December, 1963 the President assented to the same.
The act as revised deals only with certain kinds of equitable remedies. The rights codified under the 1963 Act were as under;
- Recovery of possession of immovable property (ss. 5 – 8)
- Specific performance of contracts (ss. 9 – 25)
- Rectification of Instruments (s. 26)
- Recession of Contracts (ss. 27 – 30)
- Cancellation of Instruments (ss. 31 – 33)
- Declaratory Decrees (ss. 34 – 35)
- Injunctions (ss. 36 – 42)
The other forms of specific relief mentioned in appendix A, Forms 41-6 and 49 of the code of civil procedure and in statutes such as Transfer of Property Act, Trusts Act, Partnership Act, are different in origin and nature and no advantage will be gained by including them in this Act[xx]. The subject of Specific performance is dealt in Part II, Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which may be classified under the following heads
Contracts which may be specifically enforced, Contracts which cannot be specifically enforced, Parties to an action for specific performance, Specific performance with a variation, Discretion of the Court in ordering specific performance.
The court grants specific performance in mainly two situations according to section 10 of this act firstly, if there is no standard for ascertaining the damage in such cases the contract will be enforced in specie.[xxi] And also when compensation in money is not adequate relief in facts and circumstances of case. In Ram Karan V. Govind Lal there was an agreement for the sale of agricultural land. The buyer had paid full sale consideration to the seller, but the seller even then avoided executing the sale deed as per the agreement. The buyer brought an action for the specific performance of the contract. It was held that the case is covered under Section 10(b) of the act.
The act agreed to be done is in the performance, wholly or partly, of a trust, specific performance of the same may be granted at the discretion of the court. While the general rule of equity is that the court will not compel specific performance of a contract unless it can enforce the whole contract but there are exceptions to this rule. A contract may be specifically enforced even though the promisor had no title or imperfect title at the time of the contract.
The promisor is bound to comply with the terms of the contract if he subsequently acquires the power of performing the contract. The promisee can compel the promisor to make good the contract out of the interest which the latter acquired subsequent to the contract.[xxii]
Meanwhile in certain situations the contract cannot be specifically performed, when compensation is adequate, Contracts of employment, contracts of personal service, contracts involving performance of artistic skill, like contract to sing, to paint, to act, contract of authorship are ordinary examples of things requiring personal skill and therefore beyond the capacity of the judicial process to enforce their actual performance.
In Purshottam V. Purshottam it was held that a contract to marry would fall under the category of such contracts from which a court cannot enforce the specific performance. Courts do not interfere in contracts which are determinable in nature, for example where a contract of sale is determinable at the option of the seller within a specified period on repayment of the consideration, the other party cannot get decree of specific performance of the agreement.[xxiii]
Contracts requiring the performance of a continuous duty extending over period longer than three years from the date of the contract cannot be specifically enforced, Subject to certain exceptions, the court will not enforce specific performance to build, repair, or maintain works or building
Court can exercise discretion in the matter of decreeing specific performance. This discretion is not arbitrary, but sound and reasonable, guided by the judicial principles. Under no circumstances, the court should exercise its discretion, where it would be improper. Mere on the ground that the contract is unenforceable court can’t refuse relief to any party.
The discretion of the court is to decide whether enforcement of the contract in the present circumstances is fair and if the contract is fair and reasonable character of the plaintiff has been good then the discretion of the court has no application[xxiv].
In Satya Narayana V. Yelloji Rao[xxv] the Supreme Court has observed that discretion referred in Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act cannot be defined as it is not possible or desirable to lay down the circumstances under which the court will exercise discretion against the plaintiff, but at the same time the said discretion shall not be arbitrary and must be in accordance with sound and reasonable judicial principles.
In Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa[xxvi] it was held that specific performance of contract would not be enforced by issuing a writ of or in the nature of mandamus, particularly when keeping in view the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 damages may be an adequate remedy for breach of contract. It is possible for the plaintiff to claim damages in addition or substitution of specific performance while filing a suit but as under section 21 parties should plead for the same.
In P.C. Verghese V. Devaki Amma[xxvii] the apex court held that in view of Section 22 (1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act a decree of partition and separate possession of the property can be granted in addition to a decree for specific performance. A court of equity may refuse specific performance not only for fraud but the plaintiff should not have made himself party to an illegal contract[xxviii] and also if there is a mental, physical or, legal incapacity in the plaintiff. It has also been held that it is necessary for the plaintiff to aver and prove that he has always been ready and willing to do his part of the project[xxix].
Such personal bars on granting specific performance are discussed under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act 1963[xxx]. Also a contract to sell or let property by one who has no title to it, whether knowingly or unknowingly cannot be specifically enforced. In certain cases of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake of fact where the contract fails to bring about the desired legal result, the defendant may vary some terms in the contract which the plaintiff can elect to either enforce or choose to be payed damages.[xxxi]
Also in certain cases the courts in equity and to mitigate the hardship to the vendor have directed the vendee to pay further compensatory amount. But this is not a principle of universal application. It would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Nirmala Anand V. Advent Corporation Pvt. Ltd[xxxii]
Injunction in a way could be called a mode of enforcing specific performance of negative agreements. As Maitland puts it “injunction is an order made by the court forbidding a person or class of persons doing a certain act or acts of a certain class upon pain of going to prison as contemnors of court.”
Section 37 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 deals with temporary injunction. These are granted before the trial of an action. Its object is to keep things in status quo ante[xxxiii] until the question at issue between the parties is determined. They can be granted at any stage of the suit and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Permanent injunction is granted only after the plaintiff has established his right and the actual or threatened infringement of it by the defendant. It is granted only upon the decree made at the hearing and the merit of the suit.
As discussed under section 39 an injunction restraining the doing or continuance of some wrongful act is known as prohibitory injunction and to restraint the continuance of some wrongful omission is called mandatory injunction. The injunctions are generally sought after the act is committed. Granting of injunction is a matter of judicial discretion for the court but must be exercised on settled principles of law to advance the cause of justice[xxxiv]. The exercise of decision is thus not arbitrary or capricious but is based on sound common sense and is regulated by well settled principles.[xxxv].
Injunctions rest on the equitable principle that he who seeks equity must do equity. If the plaintiff has acted in an unfair inequitable manner he cannot have relief[xxxvi]. The temporary injunction to restrain a breach of contract are regulated by the present Rule 2 Order 39 of CPC while perpetual injunctions are regulated by sections 38 to 42 of the specific relief act. The main consideration as provided by section 38(2) is that a perpetual injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced.
As decided in Chand Sultana V. Kurshid Begum if a suit is brought for specific performance and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract and the plaintiff applies for a temporary injunction to prevent a breach until the suit is disposed of the court will not grant the temporary injunction if the plaint and affidavit shows that case is not one for perpetual injunction or specific performance.
Courts have also granted injunctions against the breach of patent rights, copyright and trademark[xxxvii]. In india in the case of negative covenants even if the case is not of specialized character injunctions are granted in suitable cases. In Vinod Chandra Hiralal Gandhi V. Vivekanand Mills Ltd[xxxviii] it was held that a negative covenant must be distinct and mere affirmative stipulation is insufficient to comply with such a negative term. Therefore it can be seen that even though the origin of injunctions come from the English legal system the Indian provisions of section 42 are far more ahead of the English principle in Lumney V. Wangler, it does not require a negative covenant to be express[xxxix]
Even though the most popular equitable remedies have been specific performance of contracts and granting injunctions the Specific Relief Act 1963 has recognised more of them. Recovery of Possession is dealt with in Sections 5 to 8 of Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, any person who is lawful owner of the property can get the possession of such property by due course of law, property may be immovable property or movable property.
Then there is rectification when there exists in between the parties a complete and perfectly unobjectionable contract but the writing designed to embody it, either from fraud or mutual mistake is incorrect or imperfect and the relief sought is to rectify the writing so as to bring it into conformity with true intent, the court will rectify the writing instrument in accordance with their true intent. Rescission is also an equitable remedy, it is converse to that of specific performance.
It is a right which a party to a transaction sometimes has to set the transaction aside and restored to original position. The equitable relief of cancellation of an instrument s founded upon the administration of protective justice, for the fear that the instrument maybe injuriously used by the defendant against the plaintiff when the evidence to impeach it may be lost. Declaratory decrees are also issued by courts and are those where some right is declared in favour of the plaintiff but nothing is sought to be paid or performed by the defendant. Before the Specific Relief Act of 1877 declaratory relief in India was governed by section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859.
A moral objection to expansion of the availability of this remedy can be raised on the ground that requiring performance interferes with the promisor’s liberty more than requiring the payment of money. If this liberty interest takes precedence over the goals that specific performance serves, the equitable remedy should be prohibited or restricted[xl].
Under current law, a promisee cannot obtain specific performance simply by showing breach and the absence of an adequate remedy at law; special defenses that apply only to requests for specific performance further limit the availability of the remedy. These defenses include inadequacy of consideration, lack of security for the promisee’s performance, unilateral mistake by the promisor, and difficulty of supervising performance
A strict separation between legal and equitable remedies is detrimental to legal evolution is not necessary instead. the judicial system must strive to serve justice by embracing a flexible and responsive remedial approach. The retention of a division between law and equity inhibits the legal response to the demands of an evolving society. Arguments based in history no longer justify a restrictive and divided remedial jurisdiction. It is accepted that history and precedent cannot be abandoned altogether.
A division between law and equity must be maintained on some level but the scope of this division needs re-evaluation. The distinction between legal and equitable rights does not in itself necessitate a division in remedies. Rather, it is time to move towards a flexible framework of remedies, which is responsive to the particular circumstances of the dispute, irrespective of the historical origins of particular measure
The concept of granting equitable remedies is in the opinion of legal practitioners following the new decisions made in this regard globally, and the considerable flexibility in the menu of remedies that can be used to enforce equity, has found a new life in the modern commercial context. Even though the potential scope of equitable remedies remains largely unknown with more issues arising regarding legal remedies it is sure to be explored in future litigation.
Formatted on 27th February 2019.
[iii] Manish Singh, Difference between Equity and Equitable Remedies, available at
[iv] Law of contracts, G.C.V. Subbarao
[vi] 10 Ves 159 (1894)
[vii] Westpark, Inc. v. Seaton Land Co., 225 Md. 433 (1961, District Court of Maryland)
[viii]  AC 58.[viii]
[ix] Ryan v Mutual Tontine Assoc 1 Ch 116 (1893, Court of Chancery)
[x] Patel v Ali, 1 All ER 978 (1984, House of Lords)
[xi] 1 All ER 460 (1946, House of Lords)
[xii] Jojo v. Cole 5 WACA (1939, West African Court of Appeals)
[xiv] [xiv](1875) L.R 20 Eq. 500
[xv] (1852) 1 De GM&G 604
[xvi] 1 Ch. 708 (1909, Court of Chancery)
[xvii] Pride of Derby v. British Celanese 1 Ch. 149, 181 (1953, Court of Chancery)
[xviii] O.P.Aggarwala, The Law Of Specific Relief In India, (7th ed 1994)
[xx] Ibid. p 17
[xxi] Banwari Lal Agarwala v. Ram Swarup Agarwala AIR 1998 Patna, page 88
[xxii] Silla Chandre Sekharan v. Ramchadra Sahu,AIR 1964 SC 1789
[xxiii] Jawahar Sao v. Shatrughan Sonar AIR 1961 Pat 482
[xxiv] Rajkumari v. Lachman Ram 14 CLJ 627
[xxv] AIR 1965 SC 1045
[xxvi] AIR 2007 SC 119
[xxvii] AIR 2006 SC 145
[xxviii] I.T.C. Ltd. v. George Joseph Fernandes, AIR 1989 SC 839
[xxix] N. Satyanarayana v. Vedprakash Dusaj, AIR 2003 AP 385; Ram Awadh V. Achhaibar Dubey,AIR 2000 SC 860
[xxx] B.M Gandhi , Equity, Trusts And Specific Relief, (2nd ed. 1991)
[xxxi] K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd, AIR 1999 SC 2309
[xxxii] AIR 2002 SC 2290
[xxxiii] L D Meston school society v. kasinath misra AIR 1951 ALL 558
[xxxiv] Suryanath singh v. khedu singh 1994 supp(1) SCC 561
[xxxv] Ganapatlal v. nandlal Haswani AIR 1989 MP 209
[xxxvi] Bashesharnath v. municipal committee AIR 1940 Lah 690
[xxxvii] Exite labrotories v. AA Products AIR 1989 NOC 218 (del)
[xxxviii] AIR 1967 Guj
[xxxix] Supra 30.
[xl] Alan Schwartz, The case for Specific performance, 89 The Yale Law journal 271 (1979)