By Bani Mahajan,
Editor’s Note: In enacting fundamental rights in part III of our Constitution, the founding fathers showed that they had the will, and they were ready to adopt the means to confer legally enforceable fundamental rights.
Part III of the Constitution is said to contain the Bill of Rights for the people of India. The rights secured are the necessary consequence of the declaration contained in the Preamble to the Constitution, wherein the people of India solemnly resolved, to constitute India into a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic and to secure to themselves justice, liberty, equality and fraternity.
Laying down the propositions in Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal case, the Supreme Court held that ‘other authorities’ would include all authorities created by the Constitution or statute on which powers are conferred by law. It was not necessary that the statutory authority should be engaged in performing government or sovereign functions.
In India, the main political party, the Congress, had for long been demanding these Rights against the British rule. During the British rule in India, human rights were violated by the rulers on a very wide scale. Therefore, the framers of the Constitution, many of whom had suffered long incarceration during the British regime, had a very positive attitude towards these rights.
Secondly, the Indian society is fragmented into many religious, cultural and linguistic groups, and it was necessary to declare Fundamental Rights to give to the people a sense of security and confidence. Then, it was thought necessary that people should have some Rights which may be enforced against the government which may become arbitrary at times. Though democracy was being introduced in India, yet democratic traditions were lacking, and there was a danger that the majority in the legislature may enact laws which may be oppressive to individuals or minority groups, and such a danger could be minimised by having a Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
The framers of the Indian Constitution followed the American model in adopting and incorporating the fundamental rights for the people of India. The Constitution, not only, secures the fundamental rights, but also, provides a speedy and effective remedy for their enforcement.
Part III of the Constitution is said to contain the Bill of Rights for the people of India. The rights secured are the necessary consequence of the declaration contained in the Preamble to the Constitution,[i] wherein the people of India solemnly resolved, to constitute India into a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic and to secure to themselves justice, liberty, equality and fraternity.[ii] They have been said to be the very foundation and the corner-stone of the democratic way of life ushered in this country by the Constitution.[iii] These rights have been declared as sacrosanct, inalienable and indivisible.[iv] The minorities regard these rightrs as the bedrock of their political existence, while the majority consider them as guarantee for their way of life.[v] A significant feature of the Indian Bill of Rights is that the remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental rights is itself declared a fundamental right and is included in the very chapter on fundamental rights. An act of the State, whether legislate or executive, if inconsistent with a fundamental right, is declared to be null and void under Article 13. The nullity of such an act does not rest upon judicial pronouncement, but upon the express provision contained in Article 13.
In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu[vi], a nine-Judge bench of the Apex Court observed that the Rights were not limited; narrow rights, but provide a broad check against the violations and the excesses by the State authorities. These rights have proved to be the most significant constitutional control on the Government, particularly legislative power. They form a comprehensive test against the arbitrary exercise of State power in any area.
In a series of decisions, starting with Maneka Gandhi,[vii] the Apex Court has widened the ambit of the fundamental rights and has sought to bring these rights in conformity with the global trends in human rights jurisprudence.
Purpose of Article 12 and Article 13
In enacting fundamental rights in part III of our Constitution, the founding fathers showed that they had the will, and they were ready to adopt the means to confer legally enforceable fundamental rights. First, against whom were the fundamental rights to be enforced? Broadly speaking, against “the State”, not as ordinary understood but as widely defined by Art. 12.[viii]
Secondly, against what activity were fundamental rights enforceable? They were enforceable against laws and executive actions, which violated fundamental rights. In brief, all laws contravening and/or violating fundamental rights were declared to be pro tantovoid as defined in Art. 13.[ix]
Article 12 is the first Article in Part III of the Constitution of India. It states that:
“Definition in this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”[x]
Article 12 gives an extended significance to the term ‘state’. Art 12 clarifies that the term ‘state’ occurring in Art 13(2), or any other provision concerning Fundamental Rights, has an expansive meaning.
According to Art. 12, the term ‘state’ includes –
- The Government and Parliament of India;
- The Government and the Legislature of a State;
- All local authorities; and
- Other authorities within the territory of India, or under the control of the Central Government.
It has been pointed out at the outset that the device of guaranteeing fundamental rights by a Bill of Rights in a written Constitution was to protect the individual from governmental aggression and not from aggression by another individual,[xi] for which remedies under ordinary law were sufficient. It was to bind the state itself, the makers of laws, that fundamental rights have their origin.[xii]
Scope of Article 12:
The definition of Article 12 is only for the purpose of application of the provisions contained in Part III. It cannot be used to interpret any provision outside Part III, e.g., Art. 311.[xiii] Within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India is limited in its application only to Part III and by virtue of Art. 36, to Part IV: it does not extend to other provisions of the Constitution and hence a juristic entity which may be a ‘State’ for the purpose of Part III and Part IV would not be so for the purpose of Part XIV or any other provisions of the Constitution.[xiv]
Hence, even though a body of persons may not constitute ‘State’ within the instant definition, a writ under Art. 226 may lie against it on the non-constitutional grounds or on ground of contravention of some provisions of theConstitution outside Part III, e.g., where such body has a public duty to perform or where it’s acts are supported by the State or public officials.[xv]
Definition of State:
Initially, the definition of State was treated as exhaustive and confined to the authorities or those which could be read ejusdem generis with the authorities mention in the definition of Art. 12 itself. The next stage was reached when the definition of “State” came to be under stood with reference to remedies available against it. Thus a statutory corporation, with regulations framed by such corporation pursuant to statutory powers was considered a State, and public duty was limited to those which were created by statute.[xvi] The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia[xvii]are not a rigid set of principles so that, if a body falls within any one of them, it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Art. 12. The question in each case would be – whether in thelight of cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the govt. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found, then the body is a State within Art. 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.[xviii]Hence, when the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the government and such control is particular to the body and is pervasive, then it will be a ‘State’ within Art. 12. If the control is merely regulatory, it will not be a ‘State.’
Thus,the definition of ‘State’ in Art. 12 will include not only the Executive and Legislative[xix] organs of the Union and the States, but also local bodies (such as municipal authorities) as well as ‘other authorities’,[xx] which include the ‘instrumentalities and agencies’ of the State, or bodies or institutions which discharge public functions of a governmental character,[xxi] or in other words, it comprises all acts which can be brought within the fold of ‘State action.’[xxii]
Definition of Authority:
In Art. 12 “State” has not been defined. It is merely an inclusive definition. It includes all the authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. The word “or” is disjunction and not conjunctive. The expression “authority” has a definite connotation. It has different dimensions and, thus, must receive a liberal interpretation.
The term is wide enough to include all bodies created by the statute on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi- governmental functions.[xxv] The word ‘authority’ includes Central and State government.[xxvi]
The word ‘State’ and ‘Authority’ used in Art. 12 remain among “the great generalities of the Constitution” the concept of which has been and continues to be applied by Courts from time to time.[xxvii] It thus includes all constitutional and statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law,[xxviii] including even autonomous bodies,[xxix] and whether or not they are under the control of the Government or whether or not they may be regarded as agents or delegates of the government.[xxx]
Definition of Local authorities:- The expression “local authorities’ refers to authorities like municipalities, district boards, panchayats, improvement trusts, port trusts, mining settlement boards, etc., Rashid Ahmed v. M.B. Kairana[xxxi], is one of the earliest instances where a municipal board was held to be a local authority under Article12.
Other Authorities included under Article 12:
Laying down the propositions in Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan lal case[xxxii], the Supreme Court held that ‘other authorities’ would include all authorities created by the Constitution or statute on which powers are conferred by law. It was not necessary that the statutory authority should be engaged in performing government or sovereign functions. In support the court cited, articles 19(1) (g) and 298 which contemplate engagement of the State in trade or business and article 46 which requires the State to promote educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. In these cases ‘other authorities’ would cover bodies created for thepurpose of performing commercial activities or for promoting the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. The court also noted that in the instant case the Rajasthan Electricity Board had power to give directions, the disobedience of which was punishable as an offence. This decision in effect overruled earlier decisions holding ‘university’ not to be “the State” within the meaning of article 12.[xxxiii] Accordingly, the universities have been later held to be “the State”.[xxxiv]
List of ‘other authorities’ coming under Art. 12:
There is no common feature running through the various bodies,[xxxv] which have been held to be covered by the expression ‘other authorities’.
The expression refers to –
- Instrumentalities or agencies[xxxvi] of the Government and Government Departments.[xxxvii] But every instrumentality of Government is not necessarily a ‘Governmental Department’.[xxxviii]
- Every type of public authority, exercising statutory powers,[xxxix] whether such powers are governmental or quasi-governmental or non-governmental, and whether such authority is under the control of government or not, and even though it may be engaged in carrying out some activities in nature of trade or commerce,[xl] e.g., A board,[xli] a University,[xlii] the Chief Justice of High Court,[xliii] having the power to issue rules, bye-laws or regulations having the force of law or the power to make statutory appointments; a public corporation,[xliv] a government undertaking.[xlv]
- An authority set under a statute[xlvi] for the purpose of administering a law enacted by the legislature, including those vested with a duty to make decisions in order to implement them.[xlvii]
- A private body or a company,[xlviii]
- Society registered under the Societies Registration Act.[xlix]
- Corporation set up under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951.[l]
But a non-statutory body, exercising no statutory powers[li] is not a ‘State’, e.g.,
- A company.[lii]
- Private bodies having no statutory power,[liii] not being supported by a state act.[liv]
- A society registered under the Societies Registration Act,[lv] unless it can be held that the society was an instrumentality or agency of the State,[lvi] orexercises statutory powers to make rules, bye-laws or regulations having statutory force.
- An autonomous body, which is controlled by the Government only as to the proper utilization of its financial grant.[lvii]
In determining whether a corporation or a Government company or a private body is an instrumentality or an agency of the state, the following tests would be applicable:[lxi]
- Whether the entire share capital is held by the government.
- Whether the corporation enjoys the monopoly status conferred by the State.
- Whether the functions of the corporation are the governmental functions or functions closely related thereto which are basically the responsibilities of a Welfare State.
- If the department of the Government has been transferred to the corporation.
- Volume of financial assistance received from the State.
- The quantum of State control.
- Whether any statutory duties are imposed upon the corporation.
- The character of the corporation may change with respect to its different functions.[lxii]
In Zee Telefilms case[lxiii], Supreme Court has further held that since socio-economic policy of government has changed and the State is distancing itself from commercial activities and concentrating on governance rather on business, the scope of extending the scope of ‘other authorities’ is no longer necessary.
Also an authority located outside the territory of India may still come under the definition of ‘State’ under Art. 12 if it is under the control of the Government of India.[lxiv]
Once a body is characterized an ‘authority’ under Art. 12, several significant incidents invariably follow:[lxv]
- The body becomes subject to the discipline of fundamental rights, which means that its actions and decisions can be challenged with reference to fundamental rights.
- The body also becomes subject to the discipline of Administrative Law.
The body becomes subject to the writ jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art. 32 and that of High Court under Art. 226.
Judiciary is also subject to fundamental rights:
Article 12 does not expressly exclude the judiciary, and though Art. 12 does not expressly include judiciary, it is submitted that the judiciary, with the legislature and the executive, is included in the ordinary meaning of ‘State’ as one of the three main departments of a State; and that the ordinary meaning is not outside the inclusive definition of the ‘State’ given in Art. 12.[lxvi]
D.D. Basu argues that the analogous assumption that a court has the jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly is an obsession following from the English notion about the status and functions of the Court. But the position must have changed after the adoption of the written Constitution with a Bill of Rights. The courts, like any other organ of the State, are limited by the mandatory provisions of the Constitution and they can hardly be allowed to override the fundamental rights under the shield that they have within there jurisdiction, the right to make an erroneous decision. The jurisdiction of a Court is limited by the Constitution; it cannot, therefore, have the jurisdiction to decide contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. Where a decision contravenes a fundamental right, it is not a case of mere wrong decision.[lxvii] A decision overriding a constitutional limitation is without jurisdiction and a nullity.[lxviii]
If the decision of a Court is intra vires in the legal sense of being within the jurisdiction conferred by statute, it may be legally valid; but when it contravenes a fundamental right guaranteed by a written Constitution, it becomes constitutionally invalid.[lxix]
A 7-judge bench in the case of Antulay[lxx] held that, (a) A judicial order which violates fundamental right is without jurisdiction and (b) is therefore a nullity; and (c) may be rectified by the Supreme Court which passed that order, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
Once we reach a conclusion that a judicial decision, which contravenes a fundamental right, is without jurisdiction and void, there would remain no other reason why such a void decision of an inferior court cannot be quashed by a collateral proceeding under Art. 32, apart from appeal.[lxxi]
Recently Supreme Court held that it has power under Art. 136 or under Art. 32 of the Constitution that if on satisfaction that an earlier judgment has deprived a person of his fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.[lxxii]
Status of a Quasi-Judicial Body:
If a quasi-judicial body acts under an ultra-vires law, or outside its jurisdiction or ignores mandatory rules and procedures prescribed under relevant law, or infringe the principles of natural justice and thereby affect the fundamental rights, then its actions can be quashed by Courts.[lxxiii]This stance was further confirmed by the Constitutional Bench[lxxiv] in 1990.
Article 13 of the Indian Constitution States that:
Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires law includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usages having in the territory of India the force of law; laws in force includes laws passed or made by Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas
(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368 Right of Equality.
Article 13 is the key provision as it gives the teeth to the fundamental rights and makes them justiciable.[lxxv] The effect of Article 13 is that Fundamental Rights cannot be infringed by the government either by enacting a law or through administrative action.[lxxvi]
Existing laws inconsistent with the Constitution
This clause provides that all “laws in force” at the commencement of the Constitution which clash with the exercise of the Fundamental Rights, conferred by Part II of the Constitution shall, to that extent, be void.[lxxvii] A pre constitution law, after the commencement of the Constitution must conform to the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. [lxxviii] However, infringement of a fundamental right cannot be founded on a remote or speculative ground.[lxxix]
But this does not make the existing laws which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights void ab initio. The entire Part III of the Constitution including Art. 13(1) is prospective. Hence, existing laws which are inconsistent with any provision of Part III are rendered void only with effect from the commencement of the Constitution, which for the first time created the Fundamental Rights. The inconsistence referred to in Art. 13(1), therefore, does not affect transactions past and closed before the commencement of the Constitution or the enforcementof rights and liabilities that had accrued under the ‘inconsistent laws’ before the commencement of the Constitution.[lxxx]
On the other hand, it does not mean that an unconstitutional procedure laid down be a pre-Constitution Act is to be followed in respect of ‘pending’ proceedings or in respect of new proceedings instituted with regard to pre-Constitution rights or liabilities. Just as there is no vested right in any course of procedure, there is no vested liability in matter of procedure in the absence of any special provision to the contrary.[lxxxi]
But if the proceedings had been completed or become final before the commencement of the Constitution, nothing in the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution can operate retrospectively so as to affect those proceedings.[lxxxii] For the same reason, it is not possible to impeach the validity of that part of the proceedings which had taken place under the inconsistent law, prior to the commencement of the Constitution.[lxxxiii]
The effect of Art. 13(1) is not to obliterate the inconsistent law from the statute book for all times or for all purposes or for all people.[lxxxiv] The effect is that the inconsistent law cannot, since the commencement of the Constitution stand in the way of exercise of fundamental rights by persons who are entitled to those rights under the commencement of the Constitution, as regards persons who have not been givenfundamental rights, e.g., aliens.
DOCTRINE OF ECLIPSE
- It follows, therefore, that if at any subsequent point of time, the inconsistent provision is amended so as to remove its inconsistency with the fundamental rights, the amended provision cannot be challenged on the ground that the provision has become dead at the commencement of the Constitution and cannot be revived by the amendment. All acts done under the law since the amendment will be valid notwithstanding the fact of inconsistency before the amendment.[lxxxv] It is known as the doctrine of eclipse.[lxxxvi]
- For the same reason, if the Constitution itself is amended subsequently, so as to remove the repugnancy, the impugned law becomes free from all blemishes from the date when the amendment of the Constitution takes place.[lxxxvii]
Although a pre-constitutional law is saved in terms of Art. 372 of the Constitution, challenge to its validity on the touchstone of Arts. 14, 15 and 19 of the Constitution is permissible in law.[lxxxviii] Validity of a statute may be subject to changes occurring in societal conditions in domestic as well as in international arena with time.[lxxxix]
Post-Constitution laws, which are inconsistent, shall be void ab initio:
Art. 13(2) provides that any law made by any legislature or other authority after the commencement of the Constitution, which contravenes any of the fundamental rights included in Part III of the Constitution shall, to the extend of the contravention, be void.
As distinguished from Cl. (1), Cl. (2) makes the inconsistent laws void ab initio[xc]and even convictions made under such unconstitutional laws shall have to be set aside. Anything done under the unconstitutional law, whether closed, completed or inchoat, will be wholly illegal and the relief in one shape or another has to be given to the person affected by such unconstitutional law.[xci] Nor it is revived by any subsequent event.[xcii]
This does not mean that the offending law is wiped out from the statute book altogether. It remains in operation as regards to persons who are not entitled to the fundamental rights in question (e.g., a non-citizen in respect of a right guaranteed by Art. 19).[xciii] Nor does Cl. (2) authorize the Courts to interfere with the passing of a bill on the ground that it would, when enacted, be void for contravention of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of the Court arises when the bill is enacted into law.[xciv]
DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY
It is not the whole Act which would be held invalid by being inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution but only such provisions of it which are violative of the fundamental rights, provided that the part which violates the fundamental rights is separable from that which does not isolate them. But if the valid portion is so closely mixed up with invalid portion that it cannot be separated without leaving an incomplete or more or less mingled remainder the court will declare the entire Act void. This process is known as doctrine of severability or reparability.
The Supreme Court considered this doctrine in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras[xcv], and held that the preventive detention minus section 14 was valid as the omission of the Section 14 from the Act will not change the nature and object of the Act and therefore the rest of the Act will remain valid and effective. The doctrine was applied in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India,[xcvi] where the Act remained valid while the invalid portion of it was declared invalid because it was severable from the rest of the Act. In State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara,[xcvii] it was held that the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 which were declared as void did not affect the validity of the entire Act and therefore there was no necessity for declaring the entire statute as invalid.
The doctrine of severability has been elaborately considered by the Supreme Court and the following rules regarding the question of severability has been laid down:[xcviii]
(1) The intention of the legislature is the determining factor in determining whether the valid parts of a statute are severable from the invalid parts.
(2) If the valid and invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed up that they cannot be separated from the other, then the invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity of the Act in its entirety. On the other hand, if they are so distinct and separate that after striking out what is invalid what remains is itself a complete code independent of the rest, then it will be upheld notwithstanding that the rest had become unenforceable.
(3) Even when the provisions which are valid, are distinct and separate from those which are invalid if they form part of a single scheme which is intended to be operative as a whole, then also the invalidity of a part will result in the failure of the whole.
(4) Likewise when the valid and invalid parts of a Statute are independent and do not form part of a Scheme but what is left after omitting the invalid portion is so thin and truncated as to be in substance different from what it was when it emerged out of legislature, then also it will be rejected in its entirety.
(5) The severability of the valid and invalid provisions of a Statute does not depend on whether provisions are enacted in same section or different section, it is not the form but the substance of the matter that is material and that has to be ascertained on an examination of the Act as a whole and of the setting of the relevant provisions therein.
(6) If after the invalid portion is expunged from the Statute what remains cannot be enforced without making alterations and modifications therein, then the whole of it must be struck down as void as otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation.
(7) In determining the legislative intent on the question of severability, it will be legitimate to take into account the history of legislation, its object, the title and preamble of it.
Definition of Law:
Art. 13(3)(a) defines ‘law’ very widely by an inclusive definition.[xcix] It does not expressly include a law enacted by the legislature, for such an enactment is obviously law. The definition of law includes: (i) an Ordinance, because it is made in the exercise of the legislative powers of the executive; (ii) an order, bye-law, rule, regulation and notification having the force of law because ordinarily they fall in the category of subordinate delegated legislation and are not enacted by the legislature; (iii) custom or usage having the force of law because they are not enacted law at all. This extended definition appears to have been given to ‘law’ in order to forestall a possible contention that law can only mean law enacted by the legislature.[c]
Applicability of Article 13 to a law for amendment of Constitution:
Clause (4) was inserted by the Constitution (24th Amendment) Act, 1971, with effect from 5-11-1971, to override the view taken by SubhaRao, C.J., for the majority, in GolakNath v. State of Punjab,[ci] that a Constitution Amendment Act, passed according to Art. 368, is a ‘law’ within the meaning of Art. 13 and would, accordingly, be void if it contravenes a fundamental right. This amendment was declared void in Minerva Mill’s Case.[cii]
The provisions of part III of the Constitution should not be treated as mere legal precepts. They form part of the conscience of the Constitution. It can safely be assumed that the framers intended the provisions to be instrumental in spreading a new constitutional culture. If we exclude the rapidly expanding private sector from the enforcement of these rights, this constitutional culture will have only a limited and truncated domain for its spread. After having argued for the enforcement of fundamental rights, it remains to sort out an incidental problem. It can be persuasively argued that the gist of the relevant fundamental rights can be enforced against the private sector by ordinary legislation instead of bringing the private sector directly within the purview of the Constitution. This argument can further be reinforced with the assertion that the suggestions made in the research paper would only result in further flooding the Supreme Court and high courts with writ petitions, thereby making the court system almost unworkable.
State through Constitution secures fundamental rights, help achieve ideals given in directive principles and expect citizens to perform certain fundamental duties. All these cane only be done by the State, through the State and for the State respectively. Article 12 of the Constitution of India is of greatest importance as it defines what is State. Further, Article 13 of the Constitution of India specifies which acts of the State are regulated by the Constitution so that State does not abuse the powers given to it by the Constitution.
Edited by Nikhil Variyar
[i]P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, p. 27
[ii]BehramKhurshidv. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 123
[iii]Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845
[iv]State of Madras v. ChampakamDorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226
[v]GolakNath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643
[vi]I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861
[vii]Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
[viii]Seervai H.M., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 4th Edition, vol. 1, p 349.
[ix] Ibid., p 349.
[x]The Constitution of India
[xi] Cf. Civil Rights Cases (1883) 109 US 3.
[xii]Basu D.D., THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1st volume
[xiii] Dasaaratha v. State of A.P., AIR 1961 SC 564 (569); Ranjit v. UOI, AIR 1969 Cal 95 (99).
[xiv] Assam Small Scale Industrial Development Corpn. v. J.D. Pharmaceuticals, AIR 2006 SC 131.
[xv] Kartick v. W.B.S.I.C., AIR 1967 Cal 231 (234).
[xvi]Pradeep Kumar Biswasv. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) SCC 5 111, 124 (para 11)
[xvii]Ajay Hasia v. Khalid MujibSehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 487
[xix] Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725.
[xx] Basheshar v. I.T. Commr., AIR 1959 SC 149 (158).
[xxi] Ramana v. I.A.A.I., AIR 1979 SC 1628
[xxii] Som Prakash v. UOI, AIR 1981 SC 212
[xxiii] Webster’s Dictionary.
[xxiv] Odham’s Dictionary.
[xxv] Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857.
[xxvi] Mohd. Anwar Allai v. State of J. & K., AIR 1967 J. & K. 32.
[xxvii] Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. UOI, (2002) 5 SCC 111.
[xxviii] Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857.
[xxx] Ujjam bai v. State of UP, (1963) 1 SCR 778 (969).
[xxxi]Rashid Ahmed v. M.B. KairanaAIR 1950 SC 163
[xxxiv]Umesh v. V.N. Singh, AIR 1968 Pat 3
[xxxv] Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857.
[xxxvi] Som Prakash v. UOI, AIR 1981 SC 212.
[xxxvii] Bidi Supply Co. v. UOI, (1956) SC 267 (277).
[xxxviii] State of Punjab v. Raja, (1981) 3 SCC 66 (9-10).
[xxxix] Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857.
[xli] Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857.
[xlii] Umesh v. Singh, AIR 1967 Pat 3(9) FB.
[xliii] Paramatma v. Chief Justice, AIR 1964 Raj 13.
[xliv] D.T.C. v. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 (199)
[xlv] Som Prakash v. UOI, AIR 1981 SC 212.
[xlvi] Sukhdev v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 (1342); Sabhajeet v. UOI, AIR 1975 SC 1329.
[xlvii] Ujjam bai v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 SCR 778 (969).
[xlviii] Ramana v. International Airports Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628.
[xlix] Ajay Hasia v. Khalid, AIR 1981 SC 487 (7,11,15).
[l] S.F.C. v. Gem Cap., AIR 1993 SC 1435 (10).
[li] Debdas v. K.E. College, AIR 1964 Raj 6 (11).
[lii] S.K. Mukherjee v. Chemicals, AIR 1962 Cal 10 (12); M.C. Mehta v. UOI, AIR 1987 SC 1086.
[liii] Naresh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC (11)
[liv] Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725.
[lv] Tiwari v. Jawala, AIR 1981 SC 122
[lvi] Som Prakash v. UOI, AIR 1981 SC 212.
[lvii] Chander v. N.C.E.R.T., AIR 1992 SC 76 (5)
[lviii] Central Inland Water Corpn. v. Brojo, AIR 1986 SC 1371 (23,24,69)
[lix] Manmohan v. Commr., AIR 1985 SC 364 (8)
[lx] Sukhdev v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 (1335,1359-60)
[lxi] Ramana v. International Airports Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid, AIR 1981 SC 487; Central Inland Water Corpn. v. Brojo, AIR 1986 SC 1371
[lxii] M.C. Mehta v. UOI, AIR 1987 SC 1086; L.I.C. v. Escorts, AIR 1986 SC 370
[lxiii] Zee Telefilms Ltd. V. UOI, (2005) 4 SCC 649
[lxiv] Ramamurthy v. Chief Commr., AIR 1963 SC 1464; Dr. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VI, p. 607.
[lxv] Jain M.P., THE INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. I, 5th Ed., p 982
[lxvi] Seervai H.M., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 4th Edition, vol. 1, p 393.
[lxvii]Basu D.D., THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1st volume, p 669.
[lxviii] Mahendra v. State of U.P., (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 912 (930).
[lxix] Cf. Rogers v.Richmond, (1961) 365 US 534.
[lxx] Antulay v. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531 (38,57,60-63).
[lxxi] Basu D.D., THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1st volume, p 670.
[lxxii] Lily Thomas v. UOI, AIR 2000 SC 1650.
[lxxiii] Kamala Mills v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1942.
[lxxiv] Sitaram v. UOI, (1990) 3 SCC 223 (45,52) CB.
[lxxv] Jain M.P., THE INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6th Edition, p 905
[lxxvii]KeshavanMadhavanMenonv. State of Bombay, 1951 SCR 228 : AIR 1951 SC 128
[lxxx]KeshavanMadhavanMenonv. State of Bombay, 1951 SCR 228 : AIR 1951 SC 128
[lxxxv]BehramKhurshidv. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 123
[lxxxvii]Quasim Razvi Syed v. State of Hyderabad, 1953 SCR 589 : AIR 1953 SC 355; Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of MP, 1955 (2) SCR 589 : AIR 1955 SC 781
[xc] Deep Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 648.
[xci] Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, 1951 SCR 228.
[xcii] State of M.P. v. Bharat Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1170.
[xciii] Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., 1955 (2) SCR 589 (589-90).
[xciv] Chotey Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1951 All. 228.
[xcix] Seervai, H.M., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 4th Edition, vol. 1, p 400.
[c] Seervai, H.M., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 4th Edition, vol. 1, p 400.
[ci] Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 (1659,1670,1718).
[cii] Minerva Mills v. UOI, (1980) 3 SCC 625.