Animal Cruelty vs Religious Sacrifice: Anatomy of the Conflict Between Legislation & Religion

animal sacrifice

By Philip Oommen


On 16 June 2020, the Kerala High Court in Muraleedharan T. v. State of Kerala [1] upheld the constitutional validity of The Kerala Animals and Birds Sacrifices Prohibition Act, 1968 [2] (hereinafter ‘Kerala Act’). [3] An appeal has been filed against the Kerala HC Judgement by a Shakti Worshiper and presently this issue is sub-judice in the Supreme Court, clubbed with similar appeals from High Courts of Himachal Pradesh and Tripura. [4] The scope of the present article shall be limited to analyzing the validity of the Kerala Act.

The bone of contention is the prohibition imposed upon animal sacrifice in temples and precincts across the state by the Kerala Act. [5] Here, ‘sacrifice’ implies any activity involving the ‘killing or maiming’ animals with the intention of ‘propitiating a deity’. [6] The petitioners had challenged the validity of the Kerala Act on the ground that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 25 and 26 [7] are being violated. Additionally, the petitioners, relying upon the principles enshrined in Article 254, [8] have argued that the Kerala Act is repugnant to the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 [9] (hereinafter ‘Central Act’).

The Kerala High Court repelling the aforesaid contentions of the petitioners put forth the following observations. [10] Firstly, that Articles 25 and 26 have not been violated as the practice of sacrificing animals and birds is not essential to the religion, hence, are not protected. Secondly, that Article 254 has not been violated as the object and purpose of both the Kerala Act and the Central Act are substantially different, hence, no repugnancy exists. Thirdly, that Articles 14 and 15 have not been violated as the petitioners’ counsel did not press the instant ground, hence, nothing exists on record to prove otherwise. It is further clarified that the Kerala HC, while passing the judgement, had not considered the impleadment application of the appellant (on whose behalf the appeal has been filed in the Supreme Court), who had raised arguments concerning the rights of the Shakti Worshippers. [11] As a result, the Supreme Court might be considering the arguments put forth by the Shakti Worshippers for the very first time, and therefore, the claims of the worshippers shall also be analyzed in the present article.

Presently, the following three questions of law shall be analyzed namely, whether the Kerala Act is violative of:
1. Religious Rights under Articles 25 and 26
2. Principles of Non-Arbitrariness under Articles 14 and 15
3. Doctrine of Repugnancy enshrined under Article 254

Challenge based on Articles 25 and 26

A. Article 25 Challenge: Individual Vs Legislation

The Right to Freedom of Religion under Article 25 is subject to public health, public morality and other fundamental rights under part III of the Indian Constitution. [12] Additionally, the state can regulate secular activities associated with a religious practice [13] or may pass prohibitive laws providing for social reforms [14].

To be protected under Article 25, a practice must constitute an ‘essential’ part of a religion. [15] The question of essentiality is to be decided by the courts based on evidence to avoid non-integral secular practices being protected under the pretentious garb of religiousness. [16] Essential practices are those which are fundamental to a religious belief and constitute the cornerstone upon which the superstructure of religion is built, without which, ‘a religion will be no religion’ and ‘alterable’ practices of a religion are definitely not the core of the religion and are mere embellishments to the non-essential practices. [17]

Hereby, it is respectfully submitted that the conduct of sacrifices is not an essential practice of the petitioners’ Shakthi Tradition due to its alterable nature as indicated by the absence of any crucial consequential harm to the said tradition, despite the absolute prohibition on human sacrifices [18] and the unchallenged prohibition enforced on animal sacrifices by the Kerala Act for last 52 years and by the Madras Animals and Birds Sacrifice Prohibition Act, 1950, [19] for 18 years preceding the passing of the Kerala Act.

While several factual intricacies are involved in evaluating animal sacrifice on the touchstone of Essential Practices Test, it can be reasonably inferred, based on the well-reasoned rulings by the Kerala, [20] Tripura [21] and Orissa [22] High Courts, that the popular legal position appears to support the notion of animal sacrifice not constituting an essential part of the Hindu Religion.

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that ‘life’ under Article 21 includes all forms of life including animal life [23] and implies an inherent right to live, [24] subject to human necessity [25]. As per the Central Act, human necessity mainly includes killing animals for food [26] and religious activities [27]. Here, what constitutes the ‘religious activities’ exception is crucial to determining whether animal sacrifices would be legal. In fact, the Essential Practices Test, as evolved by the Judiciary, took inspiration from Dr Ambedkar’s famous exposition that the religious conceptions in India cover all aspects of life, from birth till death, therefore, the definition of religion must be limited to beliefs that are ‘essentially religious’. [28] If every religious act involving the killing of animals were to be covered under the ‘religious activities’ exception then it would amount to the legalization of limitless killing and abuse of animals in the garb of religion.

Such an interpretation would be unjustified as courts are required to interpret statutory provisions in
consonance with the legislative intent, which in case of the Central Act, is to ‘prevent the infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering on animals’ as indicated by the long title of the Act. [29]

Therefore, it is submitted that only essential practices must be exempted and non-essential ones (including animal sacrifices) must be held to be violative of the rights protected under Article 21 as affirmed by the Tripura HC [30]. Furthermore, the right under Article 25, being subject to ‘other provisions of Part III’, ought to be restrained where it conflicts with Article 21, thus, validating the effect of the Kerala Act.

B. Article 26 Challenge: Denomination Vs Legislation

1. Shakti worshippers: religious denomination or not?

To be protected under Article 26, there are two prerequisites which must be fulfilled. Firstly, it must be shown that the Shakti Worshippers constitute a ‘religious denomination’ by proving the presence of the triple requirement namely; a common-faith, a common-organization and a distinctive name. [31]

Secondly, it must be proved that the temples sought to be protected were established and administered by the Shakti Worshippers’ denomination. [32] It is respectfully submitted that both the prerequisites are absent in the instant case.

The First Prerequisite, as per the Delhi HC, is absent as the Shakti Worshippers are an ‘amorphous’ group of individuals having diverse practices, thereby, failing to fulfil the triple requirement. [33] The Second Prerequisite also seems to be absent as the claim is sought to be sustained against the prohibition of sacrifice in all temples in Kerala, [34] which means that the Shakti Worshippers need to prove that all the temples in the state of Kerala were established and administered by them, which in itself is highly unsustainable. Furthermore, Article 26(d) states that the religious properties must be administered ‘in accordance with law’, thus, the Kerala Act validly prohibits the non-essential practice of conducting animal sacrifices by law in accordance with the principles enshrined in Article 26.

2. Particular significance and optionality

Alternatively, if the sacrifice is presumed essential then also the significance of the place where
it is sought be performed must be of a ‘particular significance’ for the religion. [35] The Kerala Act prohibits sacrifices only at temples and precincts, and in no way enforces a blanket ban. Hence, the particular significance of conducting sacrifices within the temples in Kerala ought to be proved.

Additionally, if a certain practice is optional then it cannot be termed as ‘essential’, [36] therefore, it must be proved that even the sheer possibility of conducting sacrifices outside temple premises is disallowed in religion. It is submitted that there is a weak case to affirm this ‘particular significance’ of animal sacrifice within temples and precincts, to the exclusion of any place otherwise.

3. The ban: a step towards progressiveness?

Also, the temples are not just venerated by the locals but are respected and frequented by tourist devotees as well, hence, practices which might incite abhorrence must be avoided [37] as in the Hindu Mythology every animal is associated with a god and is venerated. [38] Additionally, offering sacrifices may be detrimental to Public Health and Morality owing to unhygienic conditions and barbarianism attributed to the live blood flowing in drains, the screaming of animals, the chanting of mantras using severed heads etc. and might result in serious panic and shocked conscience amongst some devotees [39].

Moreover, India is a progressive society and with the change in social values, religion itself has introduced reforms. [40] Thus, non-essential religious practices that sprung merely from superstitious beliefs are extraneous accretions to the religion, [41] if found in derogation of the law, can be restricted. [42] Further, Article 37 [43] entrusts the state with the task of enforcing the DPSPs enshrined under Part IV of the Constitution. A court must consider the principles enshrined in DPSPs and Fundamental Duties while assessing the restrictions placed upon the fundamental rights. [44]

Any restriction based upon DPSPs placed on fundamental rights shall be reasonable if two conditions are fulfilled namely, (1) the restriction is not in ‘clear conflict’ with the fundamental right, and (2) the restriction imposed by law is within the ‘legislative competence’ of the legislature. [45] In the pluralistic Indian society, the task of reforming religious beliefs must be left with the state as supported by Article 25(2), which is an enabling provision to allow the state to introduce laws for ‘social welfare and reform’. [46]

Therefore, as affirmed by a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, the state may validly restrict deleterious practices involving sacrifices of humans and animals. [47]

Presently, the Kerala Act envisages the enforcement of principles enshrined in Articles 48, 51-A(g) and 51-A(h) of the constitution. While Article 48 is a DPSP which emphasizes upon the prohibition of cattle slaughter, clauses (g) and (h) of Article 51A are fundamental duties that encourage compassionate treatment of living creatures and development of scientific temper, humanism and spirit of reform. Therefore, taking into consideration the contours of Article 26 and the applicable DPSPs and Fundamental Duties, it is submitted that the restrictions so imposed, in no way, pose a clear challenge to the fundamental right protected under Article 26.

Challenge based on Articles 14 and 15 

A. Article 14: The Permissible Classification Test

Article 14 embodies the general principle of equality before law and Article 15 applies the said principle to specific situations. For a classification to be deemed permissible under Article 14, two conditions must be present namely, (1) intelligible differentia and (2) rational relation between the differentia and the object sought to be achieved. In the case of the Kerala Act, though the prohibited act of ‘sacrifice’ as defined under section 2(b) seems to include every act of killing animals for religious purposes, the effect of its application is restricted by sections 3, 4 and 5 to prohibit only those acts that take place within the temples or its precincts.

Hence, the intelligible differentia is the prohibition on sacrifice of animals for religious purposes within temples or its precincts. Apparently, the object of the Kerala Act is to prohibit animal sacrifice in places of worship and not to impose a general ban on sacrifice by any religion. Such a regulation is in consonance with the mandate of Article 26(d), which authorises the legislature to regulate the administration of religious properties. [48] Therefore, the intelligible differentia involving the prohibition of animal sacrifice within temples and precincts is rationally related to the Kerala Act’s objectives. There certainly is a possibility that animal sacrifice in certain other religious properties may not have been prohibited, which might justify a scrutiny of such exclusion under Article 14.

However, the Supreme Court has clarified that such instances of ‘under-inclusion’ does not deny equal protection of law under Article 14. [49] Additionally, isolated incidents involving sacrifices within religious places of worship, such as that of the lone instance of the Edapally Church, [50] cannot invalidate the legislation as the overall effect ought to be considered. [51]

Further, Justice Krishna Iyer had famously articulated that the duty of the court is ‘not to hammer out equal justice’ but to consider whether the classification is without rational basis and unrelated to the
object of the Legislation. [52] Here, the effect of the legislation appears to be in perfect consonance with the objectives, hence, the Kerala Act is not violative of Article 14.

B. Article 14: The Manifest Arbitrariness Test

Unlike the Permissible Classification Test which is braced by all sections of the judiciary alike, the Manifest Arbitrariness Test has had a somewhat controversial existence. While the Supreme Court in some early cases [53] had rejected the Arbitrariness test, it seems that recently there has been a change in this position, spearheaded by Justice Nariman, whereby, there has been a strong inclination in favour of the manifest arbitrariness test. [54]

Over the years, the scope of this test has widened from being limited to Article 14 to the current form which involves other fundamental rights as well, [55] invoking multifarious responses from the legal fraternity. [56] However, for the sake of brevity, the instant analysis shall be limited to the recent judicial developments in respect of the enforcement of rights under Article 14.

While explaining the contours of the Manifest Arbitrariness Test, the Apex Court has held that legislation can be termed as manifestly arbitrary if it is capricious, irrational and/or without adequate determining principle or if the effect is excessive or disproportionate. [57] Recently, the Supreme Court, relying upon the aforesaid test, has struck down Sections 377 and 497 of the IPC. [58] The Kerala Act shall be evaluated on the touchstone of manifest arbitrariness in two parts.

1. Whether the Kerala Act is capricious, irrational and/or without adequate determining principle

Section 377, [59] in penalizing consensual gay sex, has been held to be Capricious and Irrational as it was based on a belief which has been contradicted by modern psychiatric studies recognizing the absence of a mental disorder and terming such acts to be a natural phenomenon. [60]

In other words, Section 377 is manifestly arbitrary as it penalizes consensual acts which are normal in the
natural course of life by terming those acts to be ‘against the order of nature’, hence, making the overall effect capricious and irrational. Additionally, it was held that the determining principle in Section 377 is ‘too open-ended’ for a penal provision, giving rise to the scope of misuse. [61]

Likewise, the archaic section 497 was struck down as it was ‘utterly irrational’ when compared to today’s constitutional morality. [62] It was also held that section 497 lacks an adequate determining principle as it is based upon the principle of ‘preservation of the sexual exclusivity of a married woman—for the benefit of her husband, the owner of her sexuality’, which reflects outdated patriarchal underpinnings. [63]

It is submitted that the scope of the Kerala Act is clear and enforces a rational classification based upon an adequate determining principle. The Kerala Act punishes the act of conducting sacrifices of animals or birds for propitiating a deity within the temples and precincts. This is in line with the constitutional morality as it enforces the principles enshrined in Article 21 read with the DPSPs and Fundamental Duties. However, the only challenge that may probably arise is in respect of the vague term ‘precincts’, which is defined in Section 2(a) of the Kerala Act as:

‘includes all lands and buildings near a temple, whether belonging to the temple or not, which are ordinarily used for purposes connected with the worship conducted inside the temple or outside, and in particular the mandapams prakarams, back-yards front-yards and foot-yards of the temple, by whatever name called, and also the ground on which the temple car ordinarily stands’ [64]

It is submitted that the definition of ‘precincts’ may be ‘too open-ended’ (might be manifestly arbitrary as per the Navtej Johar case [65] ) and might give rise to the possibility of misuse.

However, the Rule of Severability saves the validity of the Kerala Act as, instead of, invalidating a statute as a whole, only such statutory provisions are rendered inoperative that are inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights. [66]  Therefore, despite the high probability of Section 2(a) being invalidated, the validity of the Kerala Act as a whole may remain unaffected.

Further, it has already been submitted under the Permissible Classification Test analysis that the Kerala Act is based upon an ‘adequate determining principle’. Therefore, while the chances of the Kerala Act surviving the test under the instant head are high, the excessively wide scope of section 2(a) might be subjected to strict scrutiny by the Supreme Court.

2. Whether the Kerala Act is excessive or disproportionate

Section 377 [67] failed to qualify the test under the instant part as well, as the possibility of certain persons, indulging in natural consensual sexual activities, being punished with sentences going up to life imprisonment was held by the Supreme Court to be excessive and disproportionate. [68]

The Kerala Act, on the other hand, specifies comparatively lax punishments peaking at simple imprisonment for three months with fine up to three hundred rupees, [69] which in no manner seems to be excessive or disproportionate in its effect.

C. Article 15 Challenge

Article 15(1) prohibits the state from discriminating against a citizen based on grounds of race, caste, sex, place of birth, and most importantly, religion. However, the Supreme Court restricted the ambit of Article 15(1) by limiting its applicability to an individual citizen, essentially holding that the rights of a class of citizens would not be protected. [70]

Presently, the protection under Article 15(1) is claimed against the discrimination purportedly meted out against the Shakti Worshippers, who constitute a ‘class’ of citizens. Therefore, it is submitted that the protection under Article 15(1) cannot be invoked by Shakti Worshippers, by virtue of it being an individual right.

Challenge based on Article 254

Article 254 grants a parliamentary legislation superiority over state legislation if both laws share the same field of legislation under the concurrent list. The basis of the challenge against the Kerala Act is presumably that it shares the same field of legislation [71] with the Central Act and that the criminalization of animal sacrifice in temples by the Kerala Act violates the Central Act, thereby, making the former void to the extent of repugnancy.

To determine whether repugnancy exists, the pith and substance doctrine must be applied. [72] While interpreting a statute, the legislative intent is to be garnered from the language used i.e. the literal rule of interpretation must be followed [73] and if the language is clear and unambiguous, courts should abide by the same [74]. Further, the constitutionality of the statute shall be presumed and the onus of disproving the same shall be on the person assailing the Act. [75]

The Central Act states that ‘Nothing contained in this Act shall render it an offence to kill any animal in a manner required by the religion of any community’ [76]. It can be reasonably inferred from the phrase ‘nothing contained in this Act’ that the Central Act does not legalize the killing of animals for religious purposes, instead, restricts the ambit of the Act itself in issues involving the killing of animals as ‘required by the religion of any community’. Hence, the prohibition on animal sacrifice, as imposed by the Kerala Act, covers the domain (involving killings as required by religion) which was ‘purposefully’ left out of the Central Act.

As stated earlier, even if such acts are ‘legalized’, only acts ‘essential’ to a religion shall be protected. [77] Thus, animal sacrifice not being an essential practice cannot be protected under the Central Act.

Whether the Kerala Act is repugnant or not can be determined by the following three tests: [78]

1) The Direct Conflict Test

If a clear and direct inconsistency exists between the two laws and the inconsistency is ‘absolutely incorrigible’ leading to a situation where adherence to one is impossible without disobeying the other, repugnancy exists. [79]

In the present case, it is submitted that the Kerala Act, in no way, comes in direct conflict with the Central Act as religious sacrifices are left out of the purview of the Central Act altogether [80].

2) The Occupied Field Test

This test states that repugnancy arises even when there is no direct conflict because both the competing laws cover the ‘same field of law’. [81] However, if the state law does not deal with the matters forming the subject matter of the parliamentary legislation but deals with distinct matters though of a ‘cognate or allied nature’, repugnancy does not arise. [82]

In the instant case, no repugnancy arises as the Kerala Act deals with the issue of religious sacrifice which was explicitly left out of the purview of the Central Act, eliminating even a remote possibility of both the laws sharing the same field. [83]

3) The Intended Occupation Test

Repugnancy may arise if the state legislation contravenes the intention of the central legislation to ‘cover the whole field’. [84] In case of the Kerala Act, the ambit of the Central Act is ‘purposefully’ restricted by the Parliament, in respect of the killing of animals ‘as required by religion’ [85]. Hence, in the absence of such an intention, no repugnancy exists.

Even in cases of fractional overlapping where both statutes can coexist mutually, the doctrine of incidental encroachment saves the inferior statute as it is ‘in consonance with the established canons of law to tilt the balance in favour of the legislation rather than invalidating the same, particularly, when the Central and State Law can be enforced symbiotically to achieve the ultimate goal’ [86].


If dictates of reason were to be followed, the activities qualifying as ‘human necessities’ cannot be halted and can only be regulated as done by the Central Act. However, barbaric practices such as animal and human sacrifices must be done away with as such regressive practices are antithetical to the morals instilled in the Indian Constitution.

The Kerala Act aims at initiating reforms at a limited scale by prohibiting sacrifice within temples and precincts. Any attempt to portray this prohibition, brought in by the government elected by the masses, as discriminatory and repugnant must be deflected by the Apex Court, as such notions may result in the initiation of a process of reverse ageing, whereby, innumerable progressive reforms undertaken by successive executive regimes in a span of several decades might be undone.

Such an unwarranted abrogation of progressive executive policies, if initiated by the Judiciary, is not only detrimental to the constitutional values but may also pose a serious, nay dangerous threat to the very foundations of our Democracy.


  1. 2020 SCC Online Ker 2313.
  2. The Kerala Animals and Bird Sacrifices Prohibition Act, 1968 (Act 20 of 1968).
  3. Mahir Haneef, “Ban on sacrifices in temples: High court upholds Kerala legislation”, The Times Of India, June 19, 2020, available at: (last visited on Nov. 9, 2020).
  4. Dhananjay Mahapatra, “SC to examine validity of 52-yr-old Kerala law prohibiting animal sacrifice in temples”, The Times Of India, July 17, 2020, available at: (last visited on Nov. 9, 2020).
  5. Supra note 2, s. 3.
  6. Supra note 2, s. 2.
  7. The Constitution of India, arts. 14, 15, 25, 26.
  8. The Constitution of India, art 254.
  9. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (Act 59 of 1960).
  10. Muraleedharan T v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 2313.
  11. “Animal Sacrifice An Essential Religious Practice': Plea In SC Against Kerala HC Judgment Upholding Law Prohibiting Animals and Birds Sacrifices”, LiveLaw, June 25, 2020, available at: against-kerala-hc-judgment-upholding-law-prohibiting-animals-and-birds-sacrifices-158914 (last visited on Nov. 9, 2020).
  12. The Constitution of India, art. 25(1).
  13. Id., art. 25(2)(a).
  14. Id., art. 25(2)(b).
  15. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, para. 8.
  16. Tilkayat Shri Govindlalj Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638, para. 57.
  17. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770, para. 9.
  18. The Indian Penal Code, 1862 (Act 45 of 1862), s. 300; See also Ishwari Lal Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 10 SCC 437.
  19. Supra note 2, s. 8.
  20. Muraleedharan T v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 2313.
  21. Subhas Bhattacharjee v. State of Tripura, 2019 SCC OnLine Tri 441.
  22. Smt. Jayanti Das v. State of Orissa, W.P (C) no. 19827 of 2017.
  23. Animal Welfare Board of India v. A Nagaraja, (2014) 7 SCC 547, para. 72.
  24. Id. at para. 61.
  25. Id. at para. 15.
  26. Supra note 9, s. 11(c).
  27. Supra note 9, s. 28.
  28. Guatam Bhatia, “Two cheers for the Supreme Court”, The Hindu, Aug. 14, 2017, available at: (last visited on Nov. 9, 2020).
  29. Supra note 9.
  30. Subhas Bhattacharjee v. State of Tripura, 2019 SCC OnLine Tri 441, para. 127.
  31. Nallor Marthandam Vellalar v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, (2003) 10 SCC 712, para. 7.
  32. Ibid.
  33. U.N. Bhardwaj v. Y.N. Bhardwaj, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 3621, para. 40.
  34. Supra note 2, s. 3; See Also, “Animal Sacrifice An Essential Religious Practice: Plea In SC Against Kerala HC Judgment Upholding Law Prohibiting Animals and Birds Sacrifices”, LiveLaw, June 25, 2020, available at: (last visited on Nov. 9, 2020).
  35. Dr. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360, para. 78.
  36. State of West Bengal v. Ashutosh Lahiri, (1995) 1 SCC 189, para. 8.
  37. Subhas Bhattacarjee v. State of Tripura, 2019 SCC OnLine Tri 441, para. 112.
  38. Dr. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360, para. 83.
  39. Subhas Bhattacharjee v. State of Tripura, 2019 SCC OnLine Tri 441, para. 78.
  40. A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P, (1996) 9 SCC 548, para. 71.
  41. Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402, para. 33.
  42. N Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board, (2002) 8 SCC 106, para. 18.
  43. The Constitution of India, art. 37.
  44. Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh v. State of A.P, (2006) 4 SCC 162, para. 67.
  45. State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534, para. 41.
  46. Riju Prasad Sarma v. State of Assam, (2015) 9 SCC 461, para. 66.
  47. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, para. 17.
  48. The Constitution of India, art. 26(d).
  49. Superintendent And Remembrancer Of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Girish Kumar Navalakha, (1975) 4 SCC 754, para. 8.
  50. Dhananjay Mahapatra, “SC to examine validity of 52-yr-old Kerala law prohibiting animal sacrifice in temple”, Times of India, July 17, 2020, available at: temples/articleshow/77010840.cms (last visited on Nov. 9, 2020).
  51. Md. Usman v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971) 2 SCC 188, para. 6.
  52. B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, (1975) 1 SCC 166, para. 16.
  53. State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co, 1996 SCC (3) 709.
  54. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 791; Joseph Shine v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4898.
  55. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, para 294.
  56. Dhruv Patel, “Right To Equality Under Article 14: Analyzing The Evolution Of Equality Jurisprudence With Specific Reference To Review Of Primary Legislation” 10 Indian Constitutional Law Review 84 (2020).
  57. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1, para. 101.
  58. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 791; Joseph Shine v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4898.
  59. The Indian Penal Code, 1862 (Act 45 of 1862), s. 377.
  60. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 791, para. 353.
  61. Id. at para. 637.10.
  62. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4898, para. 103.
  63. Id. at para. 216.
  64. Supra note 2, s. 2(a).
  65. Supra note 62.
  66. State of Bombay v. F N Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318.
  67. The Indian Penal Code, 1862 (Act 45 of 1862), s. 377.
  68. Supra note 62, para. 353.
  69. Supra note 2, s. 6.
  70. (2003) 6 SCC 611.
  71. The Constitution of India, seventh sch., list III, entry 17.
  72. Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 3 SCC 1, para. 173.
  73. State of Haryana v. Suresh, (2007) 15 SCC 186b, para. 9.
  74. Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 SCC 653, para. 179.
  75. M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431, para. 24.
  76. Supra note 9, s. 28.
  77. Subhas Bhattacharjee v. State of Tripura, 2019 SCC OnLine Tri 441, para. 127.
  78. Innovative Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 407.
  79. Engineering Kamgar Union v. Electro Steels Castings Ltd, (2004) 6 SCC 36, para. 21.
  80. Supra note 9, s. 28.
  81. Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752, para. 10.
  82. Innovative Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 407, para. 51.7.
  83. Supra note 9, s. 28.
  84. Innovative Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 407, para. 42.
  85. Supra note 9, s. 28.
  86. Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 3 SCC 1, para. 187.

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